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• On Saturday, July 7, 2012, sales gas compressor K002D 
tripped due to high outboard dry gas seal first leak 
pressure (tag 64PI-854).   
 
 
• The compressor was kept stopped for an investigation, which 
confirmed that an actual dry gas seal (DGS) failure had 
happened on the machine; dry gas seal rupture disk open, 
dry gas seal leak lines full with lube oil, compressor uncoupled 
and found not be able to rotate, etc. 
 
 
• The installed dry gas seal set were just installed 10 
months ago in September 2011, following a complete K002D 
compressor overhaul due to a DGS failure. 
Introduction 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
4 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
Machine: Barrel type 
centrifugal compressor, 4 
impellers. 
 
Fluid: Sales gas (approx. 
mol.%: 75% methane, 10% 
ethane, 5% propane). 
 
Speed: 9579 rpm. 
 
Rated suction pressure: 
458 psia. 
 
Rated discharge 
pressure: 965 psia. 
Rated flow: 351.9 MMscfd 
 
Total power: 15268 HP / 11.375 MW 
 
Year constructed: 1998 
 
Year commissioned: 2001/2002 
Impellers 
Dry gas seal 
(inboard) 
Dry gas seal 
(outboard) 
Journal 
bearing Journal 
bearing 
Thrust 
 bearing 
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Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
Seal Application 
Seal Type 
Unidireccional rings (one direction of 
rotation), Tandem Arrangemnet 
1st seal rotating ring/ 
stationary ring 
Tungsten Carbide/Carbon 
2st seal rotating ring/ 
stationary ring 
Tungsten Carbide/Carbon 
Seal Size/Shaft Size 6.625 inches / 130 mm 
Allowable Axial Movement 
+/- 2.54 mm Including Installation 
Variance 
Allowable Radial Movement +/- 0.6 mm Except Labyrinth 
Operating Conditions and Leakage Rates 
Process Gas/M. W. 
CH4 (73-74%) + other H.C. + H2S (<4 
ppm) + H20 (0.1-0.11%)/M.W. = 17.82-
21.97 
Shaft Speed 
9,300 rpm (RATED)/9,765 rpm 
(FUTURE) 
Temperature 88.3 °C (RATED)/95 °C (FUTURE) 
Pressure 32.54-41.04 barG (486-612 psia) 
Seal Buffer Gas Filtered Process Gas 
Tertiary Seal 
Seal Arrangement  Barrier Seal With Hard Coated Sleeve 
Seal Size 165 mm 
Barrier Gas Source 100% Nitrogen 
Method of Supply Controlled Pressure/Flow Monitoring 
Controlled Gas Pressure 
Min. 0.15 barG (2.15 psig)/Nor. 0.45 
barG (6.52 psig)/Max. 1.0 barG (14.50 
psig) 
Gas Flow Rate per Seal End 
38 std. ltr./min (1.34 SCFM) at 0.45 barg 
(6.52 psig)  
Minimum Operating 
Pressure 
0.15 barG (2.15 psig) Press switch low to 
be activated  
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To LP Flare To atmosphere 
Clean and  
dry gas 
0 – 2 psig 
0 – 1 psig 
6 – 8 psig 
15 – 18 psig 
≈ 458 psia 
≈ 458 psia + 4 psig 
Buffer gas filter 
Labyrinth/shaft clearance: 0.012” to 0.015” 
Rupture disc (50 psig) 
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Field Mechanical Findings 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
• Lube oil spread all around the machine surroundings, through the secondary seal leak line 
discharge to the atmosphere (3rd floor compressor bay). 
 
• Compressor shaft was found to be stuck/not rotating. 
 
• Inboard dry gas seal 2nd leak drain to sewage (1st floor): Some traces of lube oil. 
 
• Inboard dry gas seal 1st leak drain to sewage (1st floor): Without any liquid. 
 
• Outboard dry gas seal 2nd leak drain to sewage (1st floor): Lube oil. 
 
• Outboard dry gas seal 1st leak drain to sewage (1st floor): Lube oil and hydrocarbons 
liquid. 
 
• Outboard dry gas seal 1st and 2nd leak lines (1st floor): Completely filled with lube oil.  
Outboard dry 
gas seal 1st 
and 2nd leak 
lines were 
completely 
filled with 
lube oil. 
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• Outboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk on 1st floor: rupture and full of 
debris (metal and other particles). This debris appears to belong to dry gas seal 
internal components (rotating and static rings, springs, etc.). 
 
• Inboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk on 1st floor: Not damaged. Lube oil 
only on the vent side of this rupture disc (no lube oil coming from the inboard dry gas seal 
1st leak line). 
 
• Filter for N2 supply to the dry gas seal on 1st floor: Not plugged and in good condition. 
There were no moisture or liquid traces on this filter. 
 
• Dry gas seal buffer gas filters on 1st floor (in service and standby): Liquid inside both 
of them. 
 
Inboard dry 
gas seal 1st 
leak line 
rupture disk 
was intact. 
Outboard dry 
gas seal 1st 
leak line 
rupture disk 
was found 
ruptured and 
full of debris. 
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Shop Mechanical Findings 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
• Inboard dry gas seal: Not seriously damaged (just some medium scratches in 
seal journal area), a very little amount of lube oil was found on the tertiary seal area. 
 
• Outboard dry gas seal tertiary seal: Oil contaminated and with black deposit but 
no visible wear or scratches. 
 
Outboard dry gas seal 
tertiary seal. 
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Shop Mechanical Findings 
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• Outboard dry gas seal 2nd seal: Springs had disappeared, the rotating ring 
(tungsten carbide) and the stationary ring (carbon) were found broken in pieces. 
 
• Rotating ring (tungsten carbide) and stationary ring (carbon) of the outboard dry 
gas seal 1st seal were not broken. The seal faces have scratches, on the stationary ring 
(carbon) a little piece was missing. The spring was in good conditions and in place. 
• The process side labyrinth/shaft clearance on both inboard and outboard dry gas seal has 
found be around 0.017” (design values: 0.012” to 0.15”), value acceptable.  
 
Outboard DGS 2nd seal, brooken 
rotating ring.  
Outboard DGS 2nd seal, brooken 
tungsten carbide pieces.  
11 
 
 
 
 
DCS Findings 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
• DGS 1st leak pressure outboard side 
(tag PI854) reached 8.3 psig on 30-
04-2012 and for around 2 weeks had 
higher values than the normal values 
of 0-2 psig. 
 
 
• DGS 1st leak pressure inboard board 
side (tag PI853) on 04-07-2012 
start increasing to 4 psig until the 
trip on 07-07-2012, normal values 
0-2 psig.  
 
• 2nd leak pressure inboard and outboard side 
(tags PI857/PI867) started to rise around 
20-06-2012 and reach 7/6 psig on 30-
06-2012 then dropped to 5/4 psig until 
the trip on 07-07-2012, normal values 0-1 
psig.  
 
 
 
 
• 6 days before the failure, around 01-07-2012 
several DGS parameters start showing 
more fluctuations than normal.  
April 2012 
July 2012 
June 2012 
July 2012 
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• The DGS buffer gas ∆P (tag PDIT841) 
values start fluctuating around 2:30 h before 
the. trip on 07-07-2012. 
 
 
• Between 02-07-2012 to 03-07-2012 (5-6 days 
before the failure), the DGS buffer gas ∆P 
showed several times unusual fluctuations.  
 
• The tertiary seal N2 gas supply flow (Tag FI853) 
increase to 168 SCFH on 14-06-2012 and 
drop again to normal values of 80-90 SFCH. It 
increase back to around 150-160 SCFH on 04-
07-2012 and maintain this values until the trip 
on 07-07-2012.  
 
 
• The lube oil pressure (PIT 865) to the bearings 
has been around 20-21 psig, which is higher 
than the COMPRESSOR OEM recommended 
values of 15-17 psig. 
June 2012 
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Vibration Monitoring System (VMS)  
Findings 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
 
• The vibration monitoring system 
(VMS) is configured with 3 
seconds filter time delay for the 
danger alarm (i.e., HH vibration) to 
avoid trips on vibration spikes. 
 
• As per API 670 Machinery Protection 
System section 5.4.1.5:  
  
“With exception of electronic over 
speed detection, fixed time delays for 
shutdown (danger) relay activation that 
are field changeable (via controlled 
access) to require from 1 to 3 seconds 
sustained violation. A delay of  1 
second shall be standard.” 
 
 
• Before the trip of 07-07-2012 20:51:01 h due to the DGS 1st seal leak outboard, there 
was a vibration peak 2.36-2.6 mils Pk-Pk at 20:50:55 h (compressors bearings) above 
the shutdown value (2.26 mils Pk-Pk) that lasted no more than 1 second.  
 
• As vibration peak at 07-07-2012 20:50:55 h of 2.36-2.6 mils Pk-Pk lasted less than 
the current 3 second time delay it didn’t cause a trip. 
 
2.6  mils Pk-Pk  
at 20:50:55 h Compressor trip 
20:51:01 h 
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• Considering the major findings we have described before, the theoretically possible causal 
factors for this failure are (as per API dry gas seal  subcommittee RCA table): 
 
• Dry gas seal secondary seal failure. 
• Dry gas seal N2 tertiary seal failure.  
• Excessive lube oil supply to compressor bearing.  
• Liquid in dry gas seal buffer gas.  
• Reverse pressurization-pressure deformation of the dry gas seal 2nd seal.  
• Excessive vibration. 
• N2 failure or contamination. 
 
• During our investigation we ruled out two of the previous theoretically possible causal 
factors: 
 
• Excessive vibration – The trends show that the compressor vibrations were stable 
within the acceptable values (below alarm) without any spikes or increasing trend. 
 
• N2 failure or contamination – The trends values show that the N2 pressure has 
always supply whenever the lube oil system was working. The N2 supply filter has  
without any moisture/liquid, there were some particles but were retained by the 
filter mesh. 
 
 
• We asked DGS manufacturer to perform a failure analysis on both dry gas seal 
(inboard and outboard).  
15 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
• The DGS manufacturer investigation report 
states the  cause for this seal failure was 
due to reverse pressurization of the dry 
gas seal 2nd seal, outboard side.   
 
• Reverse pressurization occurs when the 
pressure on the ID of the seal is higher 
than the OD of the seal (normally the 
seal operated with the pressure on the OD 
higher than on the ID of the seal). 
• Reverse pressurization tends to close the 
faces at the outside diameter producing a 
divergent gap, which can cause thermal stress 
at the OD of the tungsten carbide seat due to 
localized high temperature. 
 
 
 
• The localized thermal stress create and 
propagated axial cracks through the seat 
which can cause a catastrophic DGS failure. 
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Analysis 
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• There were traces of liquid residues on the dry 
gas seal 2nd leak seat, outboard side; 
 
• API 617 “Axial and Centrifugal Compressor 
and Expanders for Petroleum, Chemical and 
Gas” identifies the possibility of reverse 
pressurization causing DGS failure:  
 
“2.8.4.2 Self-acting dry gas seals shall be provided with 
connections to allow the user to inject filtered gas, and 
to protect against reversal of differential pressure 
during sub-atmospheric operation. Note: Some self-
acting dry gas seals can be destroyed by reversal of 
pressure differential.”  
• As stated in article “Design Improvements Enhance Dry Gas Seal’s Ability to Handle Reverse 
Pressurization” of the Turbomachinery Symposium, dry gas seal failure can occur for 
values of around 6 psig reverse pressurization in running conditions. 
 
• The maximum reverse pressurization we had on the dry gas seal 2nd seal was of 4-6 
psig during around 10-15 days before the failure (running conditions). 
 
• Reverse pressurization under static conditions can also cause damage to the DGS 
(“Dry Gas Seal Retrofit” article of the Turbomachinery Symposium) and should be limited 
normally around 10 psig. 
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• The possible causes for reverse pressurization of the dry gas 
seal 2nd seal in running conditions are: 
 
• N2 supply failure or contamination (already ruled out 
before). 
• N2 barrier seal failure.  
• 2nd leak vent line blockage. 
 
 
• DGS manufacturer didn’t find any major or severe 
damage to the N2 barrier seal failure.  
• On the K002D failure of September 2011, all the  
dry gas seal console and pipe was found 
completely full with lube oil for both DGS ends. 
 
• There is the possibility that some oil from the 
September 2011 failure to have been trapped on 
the 2nd vent line low points (between the 1st and 3rd 
floor of the compressor bay), which may have 
contributed to the 2nd vent dry gas seal leak 
line blockage of July 2012. 
DGS 2nd leak 
pipe to 
atmosphere 
(3rd floor 
compressor bay) 
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• Dry gas seal technology has developed around 1970s and its first oil and 
gas industrial application were around 1980s.   
 
• DGS has been applied in the process gas centrifugal compressor for 
around 35-40 years but there is still no complete and extensive 
industry accepted standard for dry gas seal and their support 
system design.  
 
• The API has only started addressing gas seal design in its standard “API 
Std 614 - Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control Systems and 
Auxiliaries” in 1999.  
 
• The sales gas compressor K002 A-D were design around 1998-1999 
so at the time API didn’t even address the dry gas seal technology design 
and reliability concerns.  
 
• Only in “API Std 614 - Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control 
Systems and Auxiliaries” latest edition (2008) the dry gas seal support 
design is described much more in detail, but the API subcommittee on 
mechanical is still working on a new dry gas seal standard. 
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Conclusions 
Author: Sergio Vidal (February 2015) 
 
 
• Our final conclusion is that the K002D dry gas seal failure of July 2012 
(outboard seal) was due to the dry gas seal reverse pressurization 
of the 2nd seal, probably due to the 2nd leak vent line 
blockage/partial filling with oil.   
 
 
• This failure could have been prevented if the original dry gas seal 
design and instrumentation by DGS manufacturer/ 
COMPRESSOR OEM made in 1999 had been properly setup to  
protect our dry gas seal from reverse pressurization. In 1999, the DGS 
manufacturer already knew about such phenomena. 
 
 
• The liquid content that we found on the buffer gas was not the 
root cause for this failure but will cause a dry gas seal failure in the 
long run. 
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• Change the current DGS secondary leak pressure (PIT857/PIT 
867) alarm from 12 psig to 4 psig – DGS manufacturer 
recommendation accepted by compressor OEM. 
 
• Don’t run the compressor lube oil system without having N2 
supply to the DGS tertiary seal – DCS interlock to prevent this 
situation. 
 
• Change the current time delay setting for the vibration protection 
systems shutdown values from 3 seconds to 1 second, which is the 
standard value recommended by API 670. 
 
• DGS instrumentation (pressure and flow transmitters) should be 
replaced/sent to calibration every 5 years. 
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Recomendations 
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• Normal lube oil pressure range should be around 15-17 psig 
(set-point: 17 psig), the lube oil pressure must not higher than 17 
psig, use PCV 874 to control this pressure.  
 
• In all compressors dry gas seal replacement, properly clean (by 
solvent, water, high air pressure, etc.) the 1st and 2nd vent 
leak line to the flare and the atmosphere between the 
compressor 1st floor and 2nd/3rd floor. 
 
• Install a invert U-shape pipe at the end of the 2nd leak vent 
line of all sales gas compressors to prevent dirt and liquid from 
entering the 2nd leak vent line. 
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Thank you very much for your 
time! 
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Any questions, doubts, 
comments? 
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